Even though SAP has more than 10,000 standard transactions, all companies create their own custom ones. There are different reasons for building custom transactions. For example, a user might need a specific report, a list, or a functionality that isn't in the system. Sometimes there are even cases where custom transactions with identical functionality of an existing standard transaction are created. Creating custom transactions isn't a problem, it is a normal usage of the system.
SAP is a complex and ever changing system, whether because of changes introduced to your SAP implementation to better suit your business, or through the application of Security Notes (Patches) to ensure that newly disclosed vulnerabilities are mitigated. In order to provide a predictable and scheduled flow of vulnerability mitigation information and security patches, SAP releases the major part of their latest Security Notes information on the second Tuesday of every month.
A few days ago, an important set of bugs that affect the suites of protocols TLS/SSL were published in https://www.smacktls.com/. These protocols are mainly used as the security layer underlying the HTTP(s) protocol, but many other protocols may be affected. The described vulnerabilities have received specific names: SKIP-TLS and FREAK.
Hi! In this post I want to summarize you another little-known behavior of SAP Gateway, which is its ability to act as a proxy. Basically when we want to perform an RFC connection two parameters are specified: the IP of the gateway and the IP of the application server. But wait... Is not the gateway always located in the same host than the application server? Yes, usually... but there are some specific cases where you need to use these parameters with different values.
Hi! Today I wanted to share some insight on the behavior of SAP Gateway using its ACL files. Particularly, I'll focus on the ACL which restricts direct RFC connections to the Gateway (gw/acl_file). Briefly, this ACL does not replace sec_info or reg_info (they restrict external servers), acl_file controls direct RFC connections from external clients or other SAP Systems, which is actually the most common kind of RFC connection. Check this document describing the ACL syntax.
SAP has its own specific JAVA virtual machine implementation called SAPJVM, which according to SAP documentation: "...is derived from Sun’s HotSpot VM and JDK implementation ... the SAP JVM is only targeting server-side applications. Certain features related to client environments are intentionally omitted or are not supported for general use.".
Authorization groups are a difficult topic to tackle in SAP as they can be considered a double-edged sword. With proper implementation it’s possible to take security to the next level, however if not properly implemented, authorization groups can lead to usage issues and can create a false sense of security. These problems arise due to different reasons:
SAP is a complex and ever changing system, whether because of changes introduced to SAP implementation to better suit the business, or through the application of Security Notes (Patches) to ensure that newly disclosed vulnerabilities are mitigated. In order to provide a predictable and scheduled flow of vulnerability mitigation information and security patches, SAP releases the major part of their latest Security Notes information on the second Tuesday of every month.
Last week a new vulnerability was reported, affecting the GNU C library (glibc). This vulnerability affects a wide range of Linux distributions, among which are some supported by SAP products as stated in SAP Note 171356.
It's important to understand that even though this vulnerability does not directly affect any SAP application, it affects a lower layer, the operating system, allowing any application to potentially use the vulnerable function.