TMSADM user with Default Password: another risk in your SAP system

As our readers know, we continuously share details to raise awareness and enable organizations to further secure their SAP infrastructure. In this specific blog, we will focus on one of the well-known SAP default users: TMSADM. What the security implications are of having it enabled with default passwords, and how to properly protect it? As you can imagine, it is not as simple as it sounds, so that’s why we created this blogpost for you.

SAP Security Notes March 2017: Onapsis Helps Secure Critical Bugs in SAP HANA

Today SAP release its monthly Security Notes, as they do the every second Tuesday of every month. Among the 27 SAP Security Notes published today, 5 of them are related to SAP HANA, and were originally reported by Onapsis Research Labs. One of them, note #2424173, is the only SAP Security Note tagged as Hot News this month as it solves several vulnerabilities in the Self Service component (disabled by default) that can allow an attacker to fully compromise the SAP HANA system without the need of credentials.

SAP Security Notes 2016: A Year in Review

Since its foundation, the Onapsis Research Labs have been actively helping SAP improve its security by researching and reporting system vulnerabilities. On the second Tuesday of each month, the Onapsis Research Labs publishes a detailed analysis of the latest SAP security notes. This helps to better assist our customers secure their SAP systems from the latest threats, and helps to ensure that our products are designed to continuously detect new vulnerabilities.

Onapsis Research Labs First to Help Discover and Fix Vulnerabilities in SAP HANA SPS12 - SAP Security Notes December 2016

Today SAP published 23 Security Notes, making a total of 32 notes since last second Tuesday of November, considering several notes that were published outside of the normal publishing schedule. As with every month, the Onapsis Research Labs have an impact on how SAP Security evolves. This month, 6 SAP Security Notes were reported to SAP by our researchers Sergio Abraham, Nahuel Sanchez and Emiliano Fausto (all of them recognized in SAP Webpage).

Who is Truly Responsible for Securing SAP Systems?

Not too long ago I published a blog which discussed operationalizing your SAP cybersecurity strategy. In that post I discussed the confusion around division of responsibilities, who should own SAP security, and how SAP security gets operationalized within the organization as this is a common problem my team and I have noticed across organizations.

Building Secure Transactions on SAP Systems

Even though SAP has more than 10,000 standard transactions, all companies create their own custom ones. There are different reasons for building custom transactions. For example, a user might need a specific report, a list, or a functionality that isn't in the system. Sometimes there are even cases where custom transactions with identical functionality of an existing standard transaction are created. Creating custom transactions isn't a problem, it is a normal usage of the system.

Analyzing SAP Security Notes March 2015 Edition

SAP is a complex and ever changing system, whether because of changes introduced to your SAP implementation to better suit your business, or through the application of Security Notes (Patches) to ensure that newly disclosed vulnerabilities are mitigated. In order to provide a predictable and scheduled flow of vulnerability mitigation information and security patches, SAP releases the major part of their latest Security Notes information on the second Tuesday of every month.

SKIP-TLS/FREAK Vulnerabilities and SAP Systems

A few days ago, an important set of bugs that affect the suites of protocols TLS/SSL were published in https://www.smacktls.com/. These protocols are mainly used as the security layer underlying the HTTP(s) protocol, but many other protocols may be affected. The described vulnerabilities have received specific names: SKIP-TLS and FREAK.

Pages